Paper 2015/500

Fault Cryptanalysis of CHES 2014 Symmetric Infective Countermeasure

Alberto Battistello and Christophe Giraud


Fault injection has become over the years one of the most dangerous threats for embedded devices such as smartcards. It is thus mandatory for any embedded system to implement efficient protections against this hazard. Among the various countermeasures suggested so far, the idea of infective computation seems fascinating, probably due to its aggressive strategy. Originally conceived to protect asymmetric cryptosystems, infective computation has been recently adapted to symmetric systems. This paper investigates the security of a new symmetric infective countermeasure suggested at CHES 2014. By noticing that the number of executed rounds is not protected, we develop four different attacks allowing one to efficiently recover the secret key of the underlying cryptosystem by using any of the three most popular fault models used in literature.

Available format(s)
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Fault AttackInfective CountermeasureAES
Contact author(s)
a battistello @ oberthur com
2015-05-26: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Alberto Battistello and Christophe Giraud},
      title = {Fault Cryptanalysis of {CHES} 2014 Symmetric Infective Countermeasure},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/500},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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