Paper 2015/411
Side-Channel Analysis of MAC-Keccak Hardware Implementations
Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Xin Fang and A. Adam Ding and David R. Kaeli and Miriam Leeser
Abstract
As Keccak has been selected as the new SHA-3 standard, Message Authentication Code (MAC) (MAC-Keccak) using a secret key will be widely used for integrity checking and authenticity assurance. Recent works have shown the feasibility of side-channel attacks against software implementations of MAC-Keccak to retrieve the key, with the security assessment of hardware implementations remaining an open problem. In this paper, we present a comprehensive and practical side-channel analysis of a hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGA. Different from previous works, we propose a new attack method targeting the first round output of MAC-Keccak rather than the linear operation $\theta$ only. The results on sampled power traces show that the unprotected hardware implementation of MAC-Keccak is vulnerable to side-channel attacks, and attacking the nonlinear operation of MAC-Keccak is very effective. We further discuss countermeasures against side-channel analysis on hardware MAC-Keccak. Finally, we discuss the impact of the key length on side-channel analysis and compare the attack complexity between MAC-Keccak and other cryptographic algorithms.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Hardware and Architectural Support for Security and Privacy (HASP) 2015
- Keywords
- side-channel attacksSHA-3
- Contact author(s)
- silenceluo @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-05-01: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/411
- License
-
CC BY