Paper 2015/372

Security Analysis of PRINCE

Jeremy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, and Shuang Wu

Abstract

In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\alpha$ parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published by the IACR in FSE 2013
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6
Keywords
PRINCEblock ciphercryptanalysisrelated-key boomerangtime-memory-data tradeoff
Contact author(s)
JJean @ ntu edu sg
History
2015-04-24: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/372
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/372,
      author = {Jeremy Jean and Ivica Nikolic and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wang and Shuang Wu},
      title = {Security Analysis of PRINCE},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/372},
      year = {2015},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/372}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/372}
}
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