Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/372

Security Analysis of PRINCE

Jeremy Jean and Ivica Nikolic and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wang and Shuang Wu

Abstract: In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\alpha$ parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PRINCE, block cipher, cryptanalysis, related-key boomerang, time-memory-data tradeoff

Original Publication (in the same form): IACR-FSE-2013

Date: received 22 Apr 2015

Contact author: JJean at ntu edu sg

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150424:010047 (All versions of this report)

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