Paper 2015/372
Security Analysis of PRINCE
Jeremy Jean, Ivica Nikolic, Thomas Peyrin, Lei Wang, and Shuang Wu
Abstract
In this article, we provide the first third-party security analysis of the PRINCE lightweight block cipher, and the underlying PRINCE_core. First, while no claim was made by the authors regarding related-key attacks, we show that one can attack the full cipher with only a single pair of related keys, and then reuse the same idea to derive an attack in the single-key model for the full PRINCE_core for several instances of the $\alpha$ parameter (yet not the one randomly chosen by the designers). We also show how to exploit the structural linear relations that exist for PRINCE in order to obtain a key recovery attack that slightly breaks the security claims for the full cipher. We analyze the application of integral attacks to get the best known key-recovery attack on a reduced version of the PRINCE cipher. Finally, we provide time-memory-data tradeoffs, that require only known plaintext-ciphertext data, and that can be applied to full PRINCE.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in FSE 2013
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6
- Keywords
- PRINCEblock ciphercryptanalysisrelated-key boomerangtime-memory-data tradeoff
- Contact author(s)
- JJean @ ntu edu sg
- History
- 2015-04-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/372
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/372,
author = {Jeremy Jean and Ivica Nikolic and Thomas Peyrin and Lei Wang and Shuang Wu},
title = {Security Analysis of {PRINCE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/372},
year = {2015},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_6},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/372}
}
