Paper 2015/365

On the (im)possibility of receiving security beyond 2^l using an l-bit PRNG: the case of Wang et. al. protocol

Masoumeh Safkhani, Mehdi Hosseinzadeh, Mojtaba Eslamnezhad Namin, Samad Rostampour, and Nasour Bagheri

Abstract

Recently,Wang et al. analyzed the security of two EPC C1-G2 compliant RFID authentication protocols, called RAPLT and SRP^+, and proved that these protocols are vulnerable against de-synchronization and secret disclosure attacks. The time complexity of their attacks were O(2^{16}). In addition, they proposed an improved version of SRP^+ entitled SRP^{++}, for which they claim the security would be O(2^{32}). However, in this letter, we analyze the security of SRP^{++} and show that the complexity of retrieving all secret parameters of a given tag is $O(2^{16})$, similar to its predecessor protocol.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
RFIDEPC-C1-G2AuthenticationSecurity Vulnerabilities.
Contact author(s)
na bagheri @ gmail com
History
2015-09-13: revised
2015-04-23: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/365
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/365,
      author = {Masoumeh Safkhani and Mehdi Hosseinzadeh and Mojtaba Eslamnezhad Namin and Samad Rostampour and Nasour Bagheri},
      title = {On the (im)possibility of receiving security beyond 2^l using an l-bit PRNG: the case of Wang et. al. protocol},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/365},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/365}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/365}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.