Paper 2015/346

End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model∗

Aggelos Kiayias, Thomas Zacharias, and Bingsheng Zhang


We present the cryptographic implementation of "DEMOS", a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional "setup" assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a "randomness beacon" or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games. Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2015
e-votingstandard modelend-to-end verificable
Contact author(s)
b zhang2009 @ gmail com
2015-04-22: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Aggelos Kiayias and Thomas Zacharias and Bingsheng Zhang},
      title = {End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model∗},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/346},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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