Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/346

End-to-End Verifiable Elections in the Standard Model∗

Aggelos Kiayias and Thomas Zacharias and Bingsheng Zhang

Abstract: We present the cryptographic implementation of "DEMOS", a new e-voting system that is end-to-end verifiable in the standard model, i.e., without any additional "setup" assumption or access to a random oracle (RO). Previously known end-to-end verifiable e-voting systems required such additional assumptions (specifically, either the existence of a "randomness beacon" or were only shown secure in the RO model). In order to analyze our scheme, we also provide a modeling of end-to-end verifiability as well as privacy and receipt-freeness that encompasses previous definitions in the form of two concise attack games.

Our scheme satisfies end-to-end verifiability information theoretically in the standard model and privacy/receipt-freeness under a computational assumption (subexponential Decisional Diffie Helman). In our construction, we utilize a number of techniques used for the first time in the context of e-voting schemes that include utilizing randomness from bit-fixing sources, zero-knowledge proofs with imperfect verifier randomness and complexity leveraging.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / e-voting, standard model, end-to-end verificable

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2015

Date: received 17 Apr 2015

Contact author: b zhang2009 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150422:031427 (All versions of this report)

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