Continuous After-the-fact Leakage-Resilient eCK-secure Key Exchange

Janaka Alawatugoda; Douglas Stebila; Colin Boyd

Paper 2015/335

Continuous After-the-fact Leakage-Resilient eCK-secure Key Exchange

Janaka Alawatugoda, Douglas Stebila, and Colin Boyd

Abstract

Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to capture the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. Increased granularity of security can be modelled by considering partial leakage of secrets in the manner of models for leakage-resilient cryptography, designed to capture side-channel attacks. In this work, we use the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols, namely continuous after-the-fact leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. We resolve an open problem by constructing the first concrete two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the CAFL-eCK model.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Proceedings of the 15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2015)
Keywords: key exchange protocols side-channel attacks leakage-resilience after-the-fact leakage
Contact author(s): janaka alawatugoda @ qut edu au
History: 2015-09-15: revised; 2015-04-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/335
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/335,
      author = {Janaka Alawatugoda and Douglas Stebila and Colin Boyd},
      title = {Continuous After-the-fact Leakage-Resilient {eCK}-secure Key Exchange},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/335},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/335}
}