Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/335

Continuous After-the-fact Leakage-Resilient eCK-secure Key Exchange

Janaka Alawatugoda and Douglas Stebila and Colin Boyd

Abstract: Security models for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols have developed over time to capture the security of AKE protocols even when the adversary learns certain secret values. Increased granularity of security can be modelled by considering partial leakage of secrets in the manner of models for leakage-resilient cryptography, designed to capture side-channel attacks. In this work, we use the strongest known partial-leakage-based security model for key exchange protocols, namely continuous after-the-fact leakage eCK (CAFL-eCK) model. We resolve an open problem by constructing the first concrete two-pass leakage-resilient key exchange protocol that is secure in the CAFL-eCK model.

Category / Keywords: key exchange protocols, side-channel attacks, leakage-resilience, after-the-fact leakage

Original Publication (with minor differences): Proceedings of the 15th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding (IMACC 2015)

Date: received 13 Apr 2015, last revised 15 Sep 2015

Contact author: janaka alawatugoda at qut edu au

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150915:102246 (All versions of this report)

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