Paper 2015/317

Leakage-Resilient Cryptography over Large Finite Fields: Theory and Practice

Marcin Andrychowicz, Daniel Masny, and Edoardo Persichetti

Abstract

Information leakage is a major concern in modern day IT-security. In fact, a malicious user is often able to extract information about private values from the computation performed on the devices. In specific settings, such as RFID, where a low computational complexity is required, it is hard to apply standard techniques to achieve resilience against this kind of attacks. In this paper, we present a framework to make cryptographic primitives based on large finite fields robust against information leakage with a bounded computational cost. The approach makes use of the inner product extractor and guarantees security in the presence of leakage in a widely accepted model. Furthermore, we show how to apply the proposed techniques to the authentication protocol Lapin, and we compare it to existing solutions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.ACNS 2015
Keywords
leakage resilientLPN
Contact author(s)
edoardo persichetti @ dsu edu
History
2015-04-11: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/317
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/317,
      author = {Marcin Andrychowicz and Daniel Masny and Edoardo Persichetti},
      title = {Leakage-Resilient Cryptography over Large Finite Fields: Theory and Practice},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/317},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/317}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/317}
}
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