Paper 2015/256

Cryptanalysis of Three Certificate-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols and a Secure Construction

Yang Lu, Quanling Zhang, and Jiguo Li

Abstract

Certificate-based cryptography is a new public-key cryptographic paradigm that has very appealing features, namely it simplifies the certificate management problem in traditional public key cryptography while eliminating the key escrow problem in identity-based cryptography. So far, three authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols in the setting of certificate-based cryptography have been proposed in the literature. Unfortunately, none of them are secure under the public key replacement (PKR) attack. In this paper, we first present a security model for certificate-based AKA protocols that covers the PKR attacks. We then explore the existing three certificate-based AKA protocols and show the concrete attacks against them respectively. To overcome the weaknesses in these protocols, we propose a new certificate-based AKA protocol and prove its security strictly in the random oracle model. Performance comparison shows that the proposed protocol outperforms all the previous certificate-based AKA protocols.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
authenticated key agreementcertificated-based cryptographypublic key repalcement attackrandom oracle modelprovable security
Contact author(s)
luyangnsd @ 163 com
History
2015-03-19: revised
2015-03-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/256
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/256,
      author = {Yang Lu and Quanling Zhang and Jiguo Li},
      title = {Cryptanalysis of Three Certificate-Based Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols and a Secure Construction},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/256},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/256}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/256}
}
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