Paper 2015/246

Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

Fabrice Benhamouda, Geoffroy Couteau, David Pointcheval, and Hoeteck Wee


We introduce \emph{implicit zero-knowledge} arguments (iZK) and simulation-sound variants thereof (SSiZK); these are lightweight alternatives to zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior. Our main technical contribution is a construction of efficient two-flow iZK and SSiZK protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) DDH assumption in cyclic groups in the common reference string model. As an application of iZK, we improve upon the round-efficiency of existing protocols for securely computing inner product under the DDH assumption. This new protocol in turn provides privacy-preserving biometric authentication with lower latency.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2015
hash proof systemszero-knowledgemalicious adversariestwo-party computationinner product
Contact author(s)
fabrice benhamouda @ ens fr
2016-12-23: last of 2 revisions
2015-03-19: received
See all versions
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Fabrice Benhamouda and Geoffroy Couteau and David Pointcheval and Hoeteck Wee},
      title = {Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/246},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, does not use cookies or embedded third party content.