Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

Fabrice Benhamouda; Geoffroy Couteau; David Pointcheval; Hoeteck Wee

Paper 2015/246

Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting

Fabrice Benhamouda, Geoffroy Couteau, David Pointcheval, and Hoeteck Wee

Abstract

We introduce \emph{implicit zero-knowledge} arguments (iZK) and simulation-sound variants thereof (SSiZK); these are lightweight alternatives to zero-knowledge arguments for enforcing semi-honest behavior. Our main technical contribution is a construction of efficient two-flow iZK and SSiZK protocols for a large class of languages under the (plain) DDH assumption in cyclic groups in the common reference string model. As an application of iZK, we improve upon the round-efficiency of existing protocols for securely computing inner product under the DDH assumption. This new protocol in turn provides privacy-preserving biometric authentication with lower latency.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: A major revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2015
Keywords: hash proof systems zero-knowledge malicious adversaries two-party computation inner product
Contact author(s): fabrice benhamouda @ ens fr
History: 2016-12-23: last of 2 revisions; 2015-03-19: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2015/246
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/246,
      author = {Fabrice Benhamouda and Geoffroy Couteau and David Pointcheval and Hoeteck Wee},
      title = {Implicit Zero-Knowledge Arguments and Applications to the Malicious Setting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/246},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/246}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/246}
}