Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/239

Meet-in-the-Middle Attacks and Structural Analysis of Round-Reduced PRINCE

Patrick Derbez and Léo Perrin

Abstract: NXP Semiconductors and its academic partners challenged the cryptographic community with finding practical attacks on the block cipher they designed, PRINCE. Instead of trying to attack as many rounds as possible using attacks which are usually impractical despite being faster than brute-force, the challenge invites cryptographers to find practical attacks and encourages them to actually implement them.

In this paper, we present new attacks on round-reduced PRINCE including the ones which won the challenge in the 4, 6 and 8-round categories --- the highest for which winners were identified. Our first attacks rely on a meet-in-the-middle approach and break up to 10 rounds of the cipher. We also describe heuristic methods we used to find practical SAT-based and differential attacks.

Finally, we also present an analysis of the cycle structure of the internal rounds of PRINCE leading both to a low complexity distinguisher for 4-round PRINCE-core and an alternative representation of the cipher valid in particular contexts and which highlights, in this cases, a poor diffusion.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PRINCE, practical attacks, meet-in-the-middle, SAT-solver, statistical analysis

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-FSE-2015

Date: received 13 Mar 2015, last revised 31 Mar 2016

Contact author: patrick derbez at irisa fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: JoC version

Version: 20160331:142608 (All versions of this report)

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