Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/226

Secure Physical Computation using Disposable Circuits

Ben Fisch and Daniel Freund and Moni Naor

Abstract: In a secure physical computation, a set of parties each have physical inputs and jointly compute a function of their inputs in a way that reveals no information to any party except for the output of the function. Recent work in CRYPTO’14 presented examples of physical zero-knowledge proofs of physical properties, a special case of secure physical two-party computation in which one party has a physical input and the second party verifies a boolean function of that input. While the work suggested a general framework for modeling and analyzing physical zero-knowledge protocols, it did not provide a general theory of how to prove any physical property with zero-knowledge. This paper takes an orthogonal approach using disposable circuits (DC)—cheap hardware tokens that can be completely destroyed after a computation—an extension of the familiar tamper-proof token model. In the DC model, we demonstrate that two parties can compute any function of their physical inputs in a way that leaks at most 1 bit of additional information to either party. Moreover, our result generalizes to any multi-party physical computation. Formally, our protocols achieve unconditional UC-security with input-dependent abort.

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Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-TCC-2015

Date: received 10 Mar 2015

Contact author: benafisch at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20150311:093216 (All versions of this report)

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