Paper 2015/208

Towards Secure Distance Bounding

Ioana Boureanu, Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, and Serge Vaudenay

Abstract

Relay attacks (and, more generally, man-in-the-middle attacks) are a serious threat against many access control and payment schemes. In this work, we present distance-bounding protocols, how these can deter relay attacks, and the security models formalizing these protocols. We show several pitfalls making existing protocols insecure (or at least, vulnerable, in some cases). Then, we introduce the SKI protocol which enjoys resistance to all popular attack-models and features provable security. As far as we know, this is the first protocol with such all-encompassing security guarantees.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published by the IACR in FSE 2013
DOI
10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_4
Keywords
distance-bounding protocolsrelay attacksauthentication
Contact author(s)
mitrokatkm @ gmail com
History
2015-03-06: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/208
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/208,
      author = {Ioana Boureanu and Aikaterini Mitrokotsa and Serge Vaudenay},
      title = {Towards Secure Distance Bounding},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/208},
      year = {2015},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-662-43933-3_4},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/208}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/208}
}
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