Paper 2015/172
Silent Simon: A Threshold Implementation under 100 Slices
Aria Shahverdi, Mostafa Taha, and Thomas Eisenbarth
Abstract
Lightweight Cryptography aims at achieving security comparable to conventional cryptography at a much lower cost. Simon is a lightweight alternative to AES, as it shares same cryptographic parameters, but has been shown to be extremely area-efficient on FPGAs. However, in the embedded setting, protection against side channel analysis is often required. In this work we present a threshold implementation of Simon. The proposed core splits the information between three shares and achieves provable security against first order side-channel attacks. The core can be implemented in less than 100 slices of a low-cost FPGA, making it the world smallest threshold implementation of a block-cipher. Hence, the proposed core perfectly suits highly-constrained embedded systems including sensor nodes and RFIDs. Security of the proposed core is validated by provable arguments as well as practical DPA attacks and tests for leakage quantification.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. IEEE International Symposium on Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST 2015)
- Contact author(s)
-
ashahverdi @ wpi edu
mtaha @ wpi edu
teisenbarth @ wpi edu - History
- 2015-02-28: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/172
- License
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CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/172,
author = {Aria Shahverdi and Mostafa Taha and Thomas Eisenbarth},
title = {Silent Simon: A Threshold Implementation under 100 Slices},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/172},
year = {2015},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/172}
}
