Paper 2015/160
Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ICEPOLE
Tao Huang, Ivan Tjuawinata, and Hongjun Wu
Abstract
ICEPOLE is a CAESAR candidate with the intermediate level of robustness under nonce misuse circumstances in the original document. In particular, it was claimed that key recovery attack against ICEPOLE is impossible in the case of nonce misuse. ICEPOLE is strong against the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis. In this paper, we developed the differential-linear attacks against ICEPOLE when nonce is misused. Our attacks show that the state of ICEPOLE-128 and ICEPOLE-128a can be recovered with data complexity $2^{46}$ and time complexity $2^{46}$; the state of ICEPOLE-256a can be recovered with data complexity $2^{60}$ and time complexity $2^{60}$. For ICEPOLE-128a and ICEPOLE-256a, the secret key is recovered once the state is recovered. We experimentally verified the attacks against ICEPOLE-128 and ICEPOLE-128a.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in FSE 2015
- Keywords
- ICEPOLEAuthenticated cipherCAESARDifferential-linear cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- huangtao @ ntu edu sg
- History
- 2015-02-27: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/160
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/160,
author = {Tao Huang and Ivan Tjuawinata and Hongjun Wu},
title = {Differential-Linear Cryptanalysis of ICEPOLE},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/160},
year = {2015},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/160}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/160}
}
