Paper 2015/127
Adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes
Ricardo Dahab, Steven Galbraith, and Eduardo Morais
Abstract
In this paper we present adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes. Among such schemes, we study the proposal by Bos et al [BLLN13] in 2013. Given access to a decryption oracle, the attack allows us to compute the private key for all parameter choices. Such attacks show that one must be very careful about the use of homomorphic encryption in practice. The existence of a key recovery attack means that the scheme is not CCA1-secure. Indeed, almost every somewhat homomorphic construction proposed till now in the literature is vulnerable to an attack of this type. Hence our result adds to a body of literature that shows that building CCA1-secure homomorphic schemes is not trivial.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Accepted to the conference ICITS 2015
- Keywords
- NTRU-based homomorphic encryptionadaptive key recovery attack
- Contact author(s)
- eduardo morais @ gmail com
- History
- 2015-02-26: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2015/127
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/127,
author = {Ricardo Dahab and Steven Galbraith and Eduardo Morais},
title = {Adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/127},
year = {2015},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/127}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/127}
}
