Secure Goods Supply Chain and Key Exchange with Virtual Proof of Reality

Yansong Gao, Damith C. Ranasinghe, Said F. Al-Sarawi, and Derek Abbott

Abstract

A new security protocol of {\it virtual proof of reality} (VP) is recently proposed by Ruhrmair {\it et al.} The VP allows one party, the prover, making a physical statement to the other party, the verifier, over a digital communication channel without using any secret keys except the message sent between these two parties. The physical statement could be a physical feature---eg. temperature---or phenomena---eg. destruction---of the hardware in the prover's system. We present two applications---secure key exchange and secure goods supply chain---building on the VP of temperature, location, and destruction. Moreover, we experimentally demonstrate the first electrical circuit-based VP of destruction through the proposed hardware security primitive---a hybrid memristor and physical unclonable function (memristor-PUF) architecture, which takes advantage of the PUF extracted from static variations of CMOS devices inherent to the fabrication process and dynamic variations attributed to switching variabilities of nano memristors.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
virtual proof of realityphysical unclonable functionPUFhardware securitymemristormodel building attackssupply chainkey exchangeauthentication.
Contact author(s)
yansong gao @ adelaide edu au
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/1239

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1239,
author = {Yansong Gao and Damith C.  Ranasinghe and Said F.  Al-Sarawi and Derek Abbott},
title = {Secure Goods Supply Chain and Key Exchange with Virtual Proof of Reality},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/1239},
year = {2015},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1239}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1239}
}

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