Paper 2015/1235

Constant-round Leakage-resilient Zero-knowledge from Collision Resistance

Susumu Kiyoshima

Abstract

In this paper, we present a constant-round leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system for NP under the assumption of the existence of collision-resistant hash function family. That is, using collision-resistant hash functions, we construct a constant-round zero-knowledge argument system that has the following zero-knowledge property: Even against any cheating verifier that obtains arbitrary amount of leakage on the prover's internal secret state, a simulator can simulate the verifier's view by obtaining the same amount of leakage on the witness. Previously, leakage-resilient zero-knowledge proofs/arguments for NP were constructed only under a relaxed security definition (Garg, Jain, and Sahai, CRYPTO'11) or under the DDH assumption (Pandey, TCC'14). Our leakage-resilient zero-knowledge argument system satisfies an additional property that it is simultaneously leakage-resilient zero-knowledge, meaning that both zero-knowledgeness and soundness hold in the presence of leakage.

Note: minor editorial changes

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Foundations
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2016
Keywords
zero-knowledgeleakage-resistance
Contact author(s)
kiyoshima susumu @ lab ntt co jp
History
2018-08-21: revised
2015-12-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/1235
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1235,
      author = {Susumu Kiyoshima},
      title = {Constant-round Leakage-resilient Zero-knowledge from Collision Resistance},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/1235},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1235}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1235}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.