Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1219

Robust Pseudo-Random Number Generators with Input Secure Against Side-Channel Attacks

Michel Abdalla and Sonia Belaïd and David Pointcheval and Sylvain Ruhault and Damien Vergnaud

Abstract: A pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is a deterministic algorithm that produces numbers whose distribution is indistinguishable from uniform. In this paper, we extend the formal model of PRNG with input defined by Dodis et al. at CCS 2013 to deal with partial leakage of sensitive information. The resulting security notion, termed leakage-resilient robust PRNG with input, encompasses all the previous notions, but also allows the adversary to continuously get some leakage on the manipulated data. Dodis et al. also proposed an efficient construction, based on simple operations in a finite field and a classical deterministic pseudo-random generator PRG. Here, we analyze this construction with respect to our new stronger security model, and prove that with a stronger PRG, it also resists leakage. We show that this stronger PRG can be obtained by tweaking some existing constructions based on AES. We also propose a new instantiation which may be better in specific cases. Eventually, we show that the resulting scheme remains quite efficient in spite of its new security properties. It can thus be recommended in contexts where side-channel resistance is required.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Randomness, Entropy, Side-Channel countermeasures, Security models

Original Publication (with minor differences): ACNS 2015
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-28166-7

Date: received 19 Dec 2015

Contact author: sonia belaid at live fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20151221:044657 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2015/1219