Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1119

On the Possibility of Non-Interactive E-Voting in the Public-key Setting

Rosario Giustolisi and Vincenzo Iovino and Peter B. Rønne

Abstract: In 2010 Hao, Ryan and Zielinski proposed a simple decentralized e- voting protocol that only requires 2 rounds of communication. Thus, for k elections their protocol needs 2k rounds of communication. Observing that the first round of their protocol is aimed to establish the public-keys of the voters, we propose an extension of the protocol as a non-interactive e-voting scheme in the public-key setting (NIVS) in which the voters, after having published their public-keys, can use the corresponding secret-keys to participate in an arbitrary number of one-round elections. We first construct a NIVS with a standard tally function where the number of votes for each candidate is counted. Further, we present constructions for two alternative types of elections. Specifically in the first type (dead or alive elections) the tally shows if at least one voter cast a vote for the candidate. In the second one (elections by unanimity), the tally shows if all voters cast a vote for the candidate. Our constructions are based on bilinear maps of prime order. As definitional contribution we provide formal computational definitions for privacy and verifiability of NIVSs. We conclude by showing intriguing relations between our results, secure computation, electronic exams and conference management systems.

Category / Keywords: electronic elections, cryptographic protocols

Original Publication (with minor differences): VOTING '16

Date: received 19 Nov 2015, last revised 16 Dec 2015

Contact author: vinciovino at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: added publication information and revised it with minor changes

Version: 20151216:151218 (All versions of this report)

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