Paper 2015/1085

Malicious Keccak

Pawel Morawiecki

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate Keccak --- the cryptographic hash function adopted as the SHA-3 standard. We propose a malicious variant of the function, where new round constants are introduced. We show that for such the variant, collision and preimage attacks are possible. We also identify a class of weak keys for the malicious Keccak working in the MAC mode. Ideas presented in the paper were verified by implementing the attacks on the function with the 128-bit hash.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
cryptanalysisKeccakSHA-3malicious hashing
Contact author(s)
pawel morawiecki @ gmail com
History
2015-11-09: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/1085
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/1085,
      author = {Pawel Morawiecki},
      title = {Malicious Keccak},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2015/1085},
      year = {2015},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1085}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/1085}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.