Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/1067

Public Verifiability in the Covert Model (Almost) for Free

Vladimir Kolesnikov and Alex J. Malozemoff

Abstract: The covert security model (Aumann and Lindell, TCC 2007) offers an important security/efficiency trade-off: a covert player may arbitrarily cheat, but is caught with a certain fixed probability. This permits more efficient protocols than the malicious setting while still giving meaningful security guarantees. However, one drawback is that cheating cannot be proven to a third party, which prevents the use of covert protocols in many practical settings. Recently, Asharov and Orlandi (ASIACRYPT 2012) enhanced the covert model by allowing the honest player to generate a \emph{proof of cheating}, checkable by any third party. Their model, which we call the PVC (\emph{publicly verifiable covert}) model, offers a very compelling trade-off.

Asharov and Orlandi (AO) propose a practical protocol in the PVC model, which, however, relies on a specific expensive oblivious transfer (OT) protocol incompatible with OT extension. In this work, we improve the performance of the PVC model by constructing a PVC-compatible OT extension as well as making several practical improvements to the AO protocol. As compared to the state-of-the-art OT extension-based two-party covert protocol, our PVC protocol adds relatively little: four signatures and an $\approx 67\%$ wider OT extension matrix. This is a significant improvement over the AO protocol, which requires public-key-based OTs per input bit. We present detailed estimates showing (up to orders of magnitude) concrete performance improvements over the AO protocol and a recent malicious protocol.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation; publicly verifiable covert security

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-ASIACRYPT-2015

Date: received 2 Nov 2015

Contact author: amaloz at cs umd edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This is the full version of the proceedings version published at ASIACRYPT 2015.

Version: 20151103:073925 (All versions of this report)

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