Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/097
Surreptitiously Weakening Cryptographic Systems
Bruce Schneier and Matthew Fredrikson and Tadayoshi Kohno and Thomas Ristenpart
Abstract: Revelations over the past couple of years highlight the importance of understanding malicious and surreptitious weakening of cryptographic systems. We provide an overview of this domain, using a number of historical examples to drive development of a weaknesses taxonomy. This allows comparing different approaches to sabotage. We categorize a broader set of potential avenues for weakening systems using this taxonomy, and discuss what future research is needed to provide sabotage-resilient cryptography.
Category / Keywords: Sabotage, cryptographic weaknesses, backdoors
Date: received 9 Feb 2015
Contact author: rist at cs wisc edu
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20150223:214625 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2015/097
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