Paper 2015/058

Universally Verifiable Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic Cryptosystems

Berry Schoenmakers and Meilof Veeningen

Abstract

Multiparty computation can be used for privacy-friendly outsourcing of computations on private inputs of multiple parties. A computation is outsourced to several computation parties; if not too many are corrupted (e.g., no more than half), then they cannot determine the inputs or produce an incorrect output. However, in many cases, these guarantees are not enough: we need correctness even if /all/ computation parties may be corrupted; and we need that correctness can be verified even by parties that did not participate in the computation. Protocols satisfying these additional properties are called ``universally verifiable''. In this paper, we propose a new security model for universally verifiable multiparty computation, and we present a practical construction, based on a threshold homomorphic cryptosystem. We also develop a multiparty protocol for jointly producing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, which may be of independent interest.

Note: Full version of the ACNS proceedings version

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
multiparty computationverifiabilityFiat-Shamir heuristicthreshold homomorphic cryptosystem
Contact author(s)
m veeningen @ tue nl
History
2015-05-20: revised
2015-01-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2015/058
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2015/058,
      author = {Berry Schoenmakers and Meilof Veeningen},
      title = {Universally Verifiable Multiparty Computation from Threshold Homomorphic Cryptosystems},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2015/058},
      year = {2015},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2015/058}
}
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