Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2015/004

Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation and Secure Set-Intersection from Algebraic PRFs

Carmit Hazay

Abstract: In this paper we study the two fundamental functionalities oblivious polynomial evaluation in the exponent and set-intersection, and introduce a new technique for designing efficient secure protocols for these problems (and others). Our starting point is the [BenabbasGV11] technique (CRYPTO 2011) for verifiable delegation of polynomial evaluations, using algebraic PRFs. We use this tool, that is useful to achieve verifiability in the outsourced setting, in order to achieve privacy in the standard two-party setting. Our results imply new simple and efficient oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE) protocols. We further show that our OPE protocols are readily used for secure set-intersection, implying much simpler protocols in the plain model. As a side result, we demonstrate the usefulness of algebraic PRFs for various search functionalities, such as keyword search and oblivious transfer with adaptive queries. Our protocols are secure under full simulation-based definitions in the presence of malicious adversaries.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Efficient Secure Computation, Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation, Secure Set-Intersection, Committed Oblivious PRF

Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-TCC-2015

Date: received 3 Jan 2015, last revised 24 Jul 2017

Contact author: carmit hazay at biu ac il

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Version: 20170724:073519 (All versions of this report)

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