Paper 2014/934
Efficient Generic Zero-Knowledge Proofs from Commitments
Samuel Ranellucci, Alain Tapp, and Rasmus Winther Zakarias
Abstract
Even though Zero-knowledge has existed for more than 30 years, few generic constructions for Zero-knowledge exist. In this paper we present a new kind of commitment scheme on which we build a novel and efficient Zero-knowledge protocol for circuit satisfiability. We can prove knowledge of the AES-key which map a particular plaintext to a particular ciphertext in less than 4 seconds with a soundness error of $2^{-40}$. Our protocol only requires a number of commitments proportional to the security parameter with a small constant (roughly 5).
Note: Corrections from various sources has been addressed, links to implementation has been added with performance graphs and data. Also instructions on how to reproduce our results are included.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Zero-knowledgecommitments
- Contact author(s)
- rwl @ cs au dk
- History
- 2015-10-05: revised
- 2014-11-14: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/934
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/934,
author = {Samuel Ranellucci and Alain Tapp and Rasmus Winther Zakarias},
title = {Efficient Generic Zero-Knowledge Proofs from Commitments},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/934},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/934}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/934}
}
