Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/934
Efficient Generic Zero-Knowledge Proofs from Commitments
Samuel Ranellucci and Alain Tapp and Rasmus Winther Zakarias
Abstract: Even though Zero-knowledge has existed for more than 30 years, few
generic constructions for Zero-knowledge exist. In this paper we
present a new kind of commitment scheme on which we build a novel and
efficient Zero-knowledge protocol for circuit satisfiability.
We can prove knowledge of the AES-key which map a particular plaintext to a particular ciphertext
in less than 4 seconds with a soundness error of $2^{-40}$. Our protocol only requires a number
of commitments proportional to the security parameter with a small constant (roughly 5).
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Zero-knowledge, commitments
Date: received 14 Nov 2014, last revised 5 Oct 2015
Contact author: rwl at cs au dk
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Corrections from various sources has been addressed, links to implementation has been added with performance graphs and data. Also instructions on how to reproduce our results are included.
Version: 20151005:113111 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2014/934
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