Paper 2014/893
Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium
Frank Quedenfeld and Christopher Wolf
Abstract
This paper presents an algebraic attack against Trivium that breaks 625 rounds using only $4096$ bits of output in an overall time complexity of $2^{42.2}$ Trivium computations. While other attacks can do better in terms of rounds ($799$), this is a practical attack with a very low data usage (down from $2^{40}$ output bits) and low computation time (down from $2^{62}$). From another angle, our attack can be seen as a proof of concept: how far can algebraic attacks can be pushed when several known techniques are combined into one implementation? All attacks have been fully implemented and tested; our figures are therefore not the result of any potentially error-prone extrapolation, but results of practical experiments.
Note: Publication in MACIS proceedings. Full version here,
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. MACIS 2015
- Keywords
- Triviumalgebraic modellingsimilar variablesElimLinsparse multivariate algebraequation solving over $\F_2$
- Contact author(s)
- frank quedenfeld @ googlemail com
- History
- 2015-11-28: revised
- 2014-10-30: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/893
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/893,
author = {Frank Quedenfeld and Christopher Wolf},
title = {Advanced Algebraic Attack on Trivium},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/893},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/893}
}
