### Impossibility of Black-Box Simulation Against Leakage Attacks

Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, and Ivan Visconti

##### Abstract

In this work, we show how to use the positive results on succinct argument systems to prove impossibility results on leakage-resilient black-box zero knowledge. This recently proposed notion of zero knowledge deals with an adversary that can make leakage queries on the state of the prover. Our result holds for black-box simulation only and we also give some insights on the non-black-box case. Additionally, we show that, for several functionalities, leakage-resilient multi-party computation is impossible (regardless of the number of players and even if just one player is corrupted). More in details, we achieve the above results by extending a technique of [Nielsen, Venturi, Zottarel -- PKC 13] to prove lower bounds for leakage-resilient security. Indeed, we use leakage queries to run an execution of a communication-efficient protocol in the head of the adversary. Moreover, to defeat the black-box simulator we connect the above technique for leakage resilience to security against reset attacks. Our results show that the open problem of [Ananth, Goyal, Pandey -- Crypto 14] (i.e., continual leakage-resilient proofs without a common reference string) has a negative answer when security through black-box simulation is desired. Moreover our results close the open problem of [Boyle et al. -- STOC 12] for the case of black-box simulation (i.e., the possibility of continual leakage-resilient secure computation without a leak-free interactive preprocessing).

Note: 07-11-2014: the main technique is described as an extension of the one introduced by Nielsen et al. in [NVZ13].

Available format(s)
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in CRYPTO 2015
Keywords
zero knowledgeMPCresettabilitysuccinct argumentsimpossibility resultsblack-box vs non-black-box simulation
Contact author(s)
ivan visconti @ gmail com
History
2015-06-22: last of 2 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/865

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/865,
author = {Rafail Ostrovsky and Giuseppe Persiano and Ivan Visconti},
title = {Impossibility of Black-Box Simulation Against Leakage Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/865},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/865}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/865}
}

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