Paper 2014/864

How to Choose Interesting Points for Template Attacks More Effectively

Guangjun Fan, Yongbin Zhou, Hailong Zhang, and Dengguo Feng

Abstract

Template attacks are widely accepted to be the most powerful side-channel attacks from an information theoretic point of view. For template attacks to be practical, one needs to choose some special samples as the interesting points in actual power traces. Up to now, many different approaches were introduced for choosing interesting points for template attacks. However, it is unknown that whether or not the previous approaches of choosing interesting points will lead to the best classification performance of template attacks. In this work, we give a negative answer to this important question by introducing a practical new approach which has completely different basic principle compared with all the previous approaches. Our new approach chooses the point whose distribution of samples approximates to a normal distribution as the interesting point. Evaluation results exhibit that template attacks based on the interesting points chosen by our new approach can achieve obvious better classification performance compared with template attacks based on the interesting points chosen by the previous approaches. Therefore, our new approach of choosing interesting points should be used in practice to better understand the practical threats of template attacks.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Side-Channel AttacksPower Analysis AttacksTemplate AttacksInteresting Points.
Contact author(s)
guangjunfan @ 163 com
History
2014-12-20: last of 2 revisions
2014-10-22: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/864
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/864,
      author = {Guangjun Fan and Yongbin Zhou and Hailong Zhang and Dengguo Feng},
      title = {How to Choose Interesting Points for Template Attacks More Effectively},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/864},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/864}
}
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