Paper 2014/854

Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Xin Fang, A. Adam Ding, Miriam Leeser, and David R. Kaeli


Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the $\theta$ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. 2014 International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig)
SHA-3MAC-KeccakSide-channel attacks
Contact author(s)
silenceluo @ gmail com
2014-10-30: last of 4 revisions
2014-10-22: received
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Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Xin Fang and A.  Adam Ding and Miriam Leeser and David R.  Kaeli},
      title = {Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/854},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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