Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Pei Luo; Yunsi Fei; Xin Fang; A.  Adam Ding; Miriam Leeser; David R.  Kaeli

Paper 2014/854

Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs

Pei Luo, Yunsi Fei, Xin Fang, A. Adam Ding, Miriam Leeser, and David R. Kaeli

Abstract

Keccak is the hash function selected by NIST as the new SHA-3 standard. Keccak is built on Sponge construction and it provides a new MAC function called MAC-Keccak. These new algorithms have raised questions with regards to side-channel leakage and analysis attacks of MAC-Keccak. So far there exists prior work on attacks of software implementations of MAC-Keccak, but there has been no comprehensive side-channel vulnerability assessment of its hardware implementation. In this paper we describe an attack on the $\theta$ step of the first round of MAC-Keccak implemented on an FPGA. We construct several different side-channel leakage models and implement attacks based on them. Our work shows that an unmasked hardware implementation of SHA-3 is vulnerable to power-based side-channel attacks.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. 2014 International Conference on ReConFigurable Computing and FPGAs (ReConFig)
Keywords: SHA-3 MAC-Keccak Side-channel attacks
Contact author(s): silenceluo @ gmail com
History: 2014-10-30: last of 4 revisions; 2014-10-22: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/854
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/854,
      author = {Pei Luo and Yunsi Fei and Xin Fang and A.  Adam Ding and Miriam Leeser and David R.  Kaeli},
      title = {Power Analysis Attack on Hardware Implementation of MAC-Keccak on FPGAs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/854},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/854}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/854}
}