Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/823

On the Oblivious Transfer Capacity of Generalized Erasure Channels against Malicious Adversaries

Rafael Dowsley and Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Abstract: Noisy channels are a powerful resource for cryptography as they can be used to obtain information-theoretically secure key agreement, commitment and oblivious transfer protocols, among others. Oblivious transfer (OT) is a fundamental primitive since it is complete for secure multi-party computation, and the OT capacity characterizes how efficiently a channel can be used for obtaining string oblivious transfer. Ahlswede and Csiszár (\emph{ISIT'07}) presented upper and lower bounds on the OT capacity of generalized erasure channels (GEC) against passive adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability at least 1/2, the upper and lower bounds match and therefore the OT capacity was determined. It was later proved by Pinto et al. (\emph{IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 57(8)}) that in this case there is also a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same lower bound, and hence the OT capacity is identical for passive and malicious adversaries. In the case of GEC with erasure probability smaller than 1/2, the known lower bound against passive adversaries that was established by Ahlswede and Csiszár does not match their upper bound and it was unknown whether this OT rate could be achieved against malicious adversaries as well. In this work we show that there is a protocol against malicious adversaries achieving the same OT rate that was obtained against passive adversaries.

In order to obtain our results we introduce a novel use of interactive hashing that is suitable for dealing with the case of low erasure probability ($p^* <1/2$).

Category / Keywords: Oblivious transfer, generalized erasure channel, oblivious transfer capacity, malicious adversaries, information-theoretic security.

Date: received 10 Oct 2014

Contact author: rafael dowsley at kit edu

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Version: 20141012:005313 (All versions of this report)

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