### Access Control in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation

James Alderman, Christian Janson, Carlos Cid, and Jason Crampton

##### Abstract

Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation (PVC) allows devices with restricted resources to delegate expensive computations to more powerful external servers, and to verify the correctness of results. Whilst this is highly beneficial in many situations, it also increases the visibility and availability of potentially sensitive data, and thus we may wish to limit the set of entities with access to input data and results. Additionally, within an organization it is extremely unlikely that every user would have uncontrolled access to all functionality. It is also not always reasonable to publish the results of a sensitive computation. Thus there is a need to apply access control mechanisms in PVC environments. In this work, we define a new framework for Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation with Access Control (PVC-AC) that applies cryptographic enforcement mechanisms to address these concerns, and we provide a provably secure instantiation using Key Assignment Schemes. We also discuss example policies of interest in this setting.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ASIACCS 2015
Keywords
Publicly Verifiable Outsourced ComputationAccess Control PoliciesKey Assignment Scheme
Contact author(s)
Christian Janson 2012 @ live rhul ac uk
History
2015-03-25: last of 2 revisions
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/762

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/762,
author = {James Alderman and Christian Janson and Carlos Cid and Jason Crampton},
title = {Access Control in Publicly Verifiable Outsourced Computation},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/762},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/762}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/762}
}

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