A survey of Fault Attacks in Pairing Based Cryptography

Nadia El Mrabet; Jacques J. A.  Fournier; Louis Goubin; Ronan Lashermes

Paper 2014/742

A survey of Fault Attacks in Pairing Based Cryptography

Nadia El Mrabet, Jacques J. A. Fournier, Louis Goubin, and Ronan Lashermes

Abstract

The latest implementations of pairings allow efficient schemes for Pairing Based Cryptography. These make the use of pairings suitable for small and constrained devices (smart phones, smart cards...) in addition to more powerful platforms. As for any cryptographic algorithm which may be deployed in insecure locations, these implementations must be secure against physical attacks, and in particular fault attacks. In this paper, we present the state-of-the-art of fault attacks against pairing algorithms, more precisely fault attacks against the Miller algorithm and the final exponentiation which are the two parts of a pairing calculation.

Note: The article should be published at the beginning of 2015.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. Cryptography and Communications
DOI: 10.1007/s12095-014-0114-5
Contact author(s): nad elmrabet @ gmail com
History: 2014-09-26: revised; 2014-09-26: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/742
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/742,
      author = {Nadia El Mrabet and Jacques J. A.  Fournier and Louis Goubin and Ronan Lashermes},
      title = {A survey of Fault Attacks in Pairing Based Cryptography},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/742},
      year = {2014},
      doi = {10.1007/s12095-014-0114-5},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/742}
}