Paper 2014/741

Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors

André Schaller, Taras Stanko, Boris Škorić, and Stefan Katzenbeisser

Abstract

In recent years Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been proposed as a promising building block for key storage and device authentication. PUFs are physical systems and as such their responses are inherently noisy, precluding a straightforward derivation of cryptographic key material from raw PUF measurements. To overcome this drawback, Fuzzy Extractors are used to eliminate the noise and guarantee robust outputs. A special type are Reverse Fuzzy Extractors, shifting the computational load of error correction towards a computationally powerful verifier. However, the Reverse Fuzzy Extractor reveals error patterns to any eavesdropper, which may cause privacy issues (due to a systematic drift of the PUF responses, the error pattern is linkable to the identity) and even security problems (if the noise is data-dependent). In this work we investigate both these issues and propose modified protocols that eliminate the problems.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
PUFsfuzzy extractorsECC
Contact author(s)
schaller @ seceng informatik tu-darmstadt de
History
2017-01-18: revised
2014-09-26: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/741
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/741,
      author = {André Schaller and Taras Stanko and Boris Škorić and Stefan Katzenbeisser},
      title = {Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/741},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/741}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/741}
}
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