Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/713

Co-Location-Resistant Clouds

Yossi Azar and Seny Kamara and Ishai Menache and Mariana Raykova and Bruce Shepherd

Abstract: We consider the problem of designing multi-tenant public infrastructure clouds resistant to cross-VM attacks without relying on single-tenancy or on assumptions about the cloud's servers. In a cross-VM attack (which have been demonstrated recently in Amazon EC2) an adversary launches malicious virtual machines (VM) that perform side-channel attacks against co-located VMs in order to recover their contents.

We propose a formal model in which to design and analyze \emph{secure} VM placement algorithms, which are online vector bin packing algorithms that simultaneously satisfy certain optimization constraints and notions of security. We introduce and formalize several notions of security, establishing formal connections between them. We also introduce a new notion of efficiency for online bin packing algorithms that better captures their cost in the setting of cloud computing.

Finally, we propose a secure placement algorithm that achieves our strong notions of security when used with a new cryptographic mechanism we refer to as a shared deployment scheme.

Category / Keywords: cloud computing, cross-VM attacks, co-location attacks, isolation, co-location resistance, bin packing, secure multi-worker delegation

Original Publication (with major differences): ACM Cloud Computing Security Workshop (CCSW) 2014

Date: received 11 Sep 2014, last revised 12 Sep 2014

Contact author: senyk at microsoft com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140912:161615 (All versions of this report)

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