Paper 2014/695
Proof of Proximity of Knowledge
Serge Vaudenay
Abstract
Public-key distance bounding schemes are needed to defeat relay attacks in payment systems. So far, only two such schemes exist, but fail to fully protect against malicious provers. In this paper, we solve this problem. We provide a full formalism to define the proof of proximity of knowledge (PoPoK). Protocols should succeed if and only if a prover holding a secret is within the proximity of the verifier. Like proofs of knowledge, these protocols must satisfy completeness, soundness (protection for the honest verifier), and security (protection for the honest prover). We construct ProProx, the very first fully secure PoPoK.
Note: previous version had a wrong pdf
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- distance boundingrelay attackaccess control
- Contact author(s)
- serge vaudenay @ epfl ch
- History
- 2015-01-16: last of 3 revisions
- 2014-09-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/695
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/695,
author = {Serge Vaudenay},
title = {Proof of Proximity of Knowledge},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/695},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/695}
}
