Paper 2014/671

SCORAM: Oblivious RAM for Secure Computation

Xiao Shaun Wang, Yan Huang, T-H. Hubert Chan, abhi shelat, and Elaine Shi

Abstract

Oblivious RAMs (ORAMs) have traditionally been measured by their \emph{bandwidth overhead} and \emph{client storage}. We observe that when using ORAMs to build secure computation protocols for RAM programs, the \emph{size} of the ORAM circuits is more relevant to the performance. We therefore embark on a study of the \emph{circuit-complexity} of several recently proposed ORAM constructions. Our careful implementation and experiments show that asymptotic analysis is not indicative of the true performance of ORAM in secure computation protocols with practical data sizes. We then present SCORAM, a heuristic \emph{compact} ORAM design optimized for secure computation protocols. Our new design is almost 10x smaller in circuit size and also faster than all other designs we have tested for realistic settings (i.e., memory sizes between 4MB and 2GB, constrained by $2^{-80}$ failure probability). SCORAM\ makes it feasible to perform secure computations on gigabyte-sized data sets.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. CCS14
DOI
10.1145/2660267.2660365
Keywords
ORAMsecure computation
Contact author(s)
wangxiao @ cs umd edu
History
2014-09-15: last of 4 revisions
2014-08-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/671
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/671,
      author = {Xiao Shaun Wang and Yan Huang and T-H.  Hubert Chan and abhi shelat and Elaine Shi},
      title = {{SCORAM}: Oblivious {RAM} for Secure Computation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/671},
      year = {2014},
      doi = {10.1145/2660267.2660365},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/671}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.