Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/613

A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305

Gordon Procter

Abstract: This note contains a security reduction to demonstrate that Langley's composition of Bernstein's ChaCha20 and Poly1305, as proposed for use in IETF protocols, is a secure authenticated encryption scheme. The reduction assumes that ChaCha20 is a PRF, that Poly1305 is epsilon-almost-Delta-universal, and that the adversary is nonce respecting.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography /

Date: received 11 Aug 2014

Contact author: gordon procter 2011 at live rhul ac uk

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Version: 20140813:234043 (All versions of this report)

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