A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305

Gordon Procter

Paper 2014/613

A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305

Gordon Procter

Abstract

This note contains a security reduction to demonstrate that Langley's composition of Bernstein's ChaCha20 and Poly1305, as proposed for use in IETF protocols, is a secure authenticated encryption scheme. The reduction assumes that ChaCha20 is a PRF, that Poly1305 is epsilon-almost-Delta-universal, and that the adversary is nonce respecting.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint.
Contact author(s): gordon procter 2011 @ live rhul ac uk
History: 2014-08-13: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/613
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/613,
      author = {Gordon Procter},
      title = {A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/613},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613}
}