Paper 2014/543
A Practical Second-Order Fault Attack against a Real-World Pairing Implementation
Johannes Blömer, Ricardo Gomes da Silva, Peter Günther, Juliane Krämer, and Jean-Pierre Seifert
Abstract
Several fault attacks against pairing-based cryptography have been described theoretically in recent years. Interestingly, none of these have been practically evaluated. We accomplished this task and prove that fault attacks against pairing-based cryptography are indeed possible and are even practical — thus posing a serious threat. Moreover, we successfully conducted a second-order fault attack against an open source implementation of the eta pairing on an AVR XMEGA A1. We injected the first fault into the computation of the Miller Algorithm and applied the second fault to skip the final exponentiation completely. We introduce a low-cost setup that allowed us to generate multiple independent faults in one computation. The setup implements these faults by clock glitches which induce instruction skips. With this setup we conducted the first practical fault attack against a complete pairing computation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Proceedings of FDTC 2014
- Keywords
- Pairing-Based CryptographyFault Attackseta Pairing
- Contact author(s)
- peter guenther @ uni-paderborn de
- History
- 2015-10-06: last of 2 revisions
- 2014-07-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/543
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/543,
author = {Johannes Blömer and Ricardo Gomes da Silva and Peter Günther and Juliane Krämer and Jean-Pierre Seifert},
title = {A Practical Second-Order Fault Attack against a Real-World Pairing Implementation},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/543},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/543}
}
