Paper 2014/517
On the Connection between Leakage Tolerance and Adaptive Security
Jesper Buus Nielsen, Daniele Venturi, and Angela Zottarel
Abstract
We revisit the context of leakage-tolerant interactive protocols as defined by Bitanski, Canetti and Halevi (TCC 2012). Our contributions can be summarized as follows: \begin{itemize} \item For the purpose of secure message transmission, any encryption protocol with message space $\cM$ and secret key space $\cSK$ tolerating poly-logarithmic leakage on the secret state of the receiver must satisfy $|\cSK| \ge (1-\epsilon)|\cM|$, for every $0 < \epsilon \le 1$, and if $|\cSK| = |\cM|$, then the scheme must use a fresh key pair to encrypt each message. \item More generally, we show that any $n$ party protocol tolerates leakage of $\approx\poly(\log\spar)$ bits from one party at the end of the protocol execution, \emph{if and only if} the protocol has passive adaptive security against an adaptive corruption of one party at the end of the protocol execution. This shows that as soon as a little leakage is tolerated, one needs full adaptive security. \end{itemize} All our results can be based on the only assumption that collision-resistant function ensembles exist.
Note: Slightly revised version. Updated bibliography.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in PKC 2013
- Keywords
- leakage resilienceadaptive security
- Contact author(s)
- jbn @ cs au dk
- History
- 2015-03-12: last of 2 revisions
- 2014-07-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/517
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/517,
author = {Jesper Buus Nielsen and Daniele Venturi and Angela Zottarel},
title = {On the Connection between Leakage Tolerance and Adaptive Security},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/517},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/517}
}
