Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/450

Optimized Implementation of General Secret Sharing Scheme

Lein Harn and Ching-Fang Hsu*

Abstract: Secret sharing (SS) is one of the most important cryptographic primitives used for data outsourcing. The (t, n) SS was introduced by Shamir and Blakley separately in 1979. The secret sharing policy of the (t, n) threshold SS is far too simple for many applications because it assumes that every shareholder has equal privilege to the secret or every share-holder is equally trusted. Ito et al. introduced the concept of a general secret sharing scheme (GSS). In a GSS, a secret is divided among a set of shareholders in such a way that any “qualified” subset of shareholders can access the secret, but any “unqualified” subset of shareholders cannot access the secret. The secret access structure of GSS is far more flexible than threshold SS. In this paper, we propose an optimized implementation of GSS. Our proposed scheme first uses Boolean logic to derive two important subsets, one is called which is the minimal positive access subset and the other is called which is the maximal negative access subset, of a given general secret sharing structure. Then, condi-tions of parameters of a GSS are established based on these two important subsets. Fur-thermore, integer linear/non-linear programming is used to optimize the size of shares of a GSS. The complexity of linear/non-linear programming is where is the number of shares generated by the dealer. This proposed design can be applied to implement GSS based on any classical SS. We use two GSSs, one is based on Shamir’s weighted SS (WSS) using linear polynomial and the other is based on Asmuth-Bloom's SS using Chinese Re-mainder Theorem (CRT), to demonstrate our design. In comparing with existing GSSs, our proposed scheme is more efficient and can be applied to all classical SSs.

Category / Keywords: General secret sharing; Chinese remainder theorem; Secret sharing policy; Monotone function; Integer optimization; Minimal positive access subset; Maximal negative access subset.

Date: received 11 Jun 2014, last revised 21 Jun 2014, withdrawn 10 Aug 2014

Contact author: cherryjingfang at gmail com harnl at umkc edu

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20140810:122405 (All versions of this report)

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