Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/420

Bounded Fully Homomorphic Signature Schemes

Xiang Xie and Rui Xue

Abstract: Homomorphic signatures enable anyone to publicly perform computations on signed data and produce a compact tag to authenticate the results. In this paper, we construct two bounded fully homomorphic signature schemes, as follows.

\begin​{itemize} \item For any two polynomials $d=d(\lambda), s=s(\lambda)$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter. Our first scheme is able to evaluate any circuit on the signatures, as long as the depth and size of the circuit are bounded by $d$ and $s$, respectively. The construction relies on indistinguishability obfuscation and injective (or polynomially bounded pre-image size) one-way functions. \medskip

\item The second scheme, removing the restriction on the size of the circuits, is an extension of the first one, with succinct verification and evaluation keys. More specifically, for an a-prior polynomial $d=d(\lambda)$, the scheme allows to evaluate any circuit on the signatures, as long as the depth of the circuit is bounded by $d$. This scheme is based on differing-inputs obfuscation and collision-resistant hash functions and relies on a technique called recording hash of circuits. \end{itemize}

Both schemes enjoy the composition property. Namely, outputs of previously derived signatures can be re-used as inputs for new computations. The length of derived signatures in both schemes is independent of the size of the data set. Moreover, both constructions satisfy a strong privacy notion, we call {\em semi-strong context hiding}, which requires that the derived signatures of evaluating any circuit on the signatures of two data sets are {\em identical} as long as the evaluations of the circuit on these two data sets are the same.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / homomorphic signature, indistinguishability obfuscation, differing-inputs obfuscation

Date: received 3 Jun 2014, last revised 4 Jun 2014

Contact author: xiexiangiscas at gmail com

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Version: 20140605:204010 (All versions of this report)

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