Paper 2014/270

Faster Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation Using the GPU

Tore Kasper Frederiksen, Thomas Pelle Jakobsen, and Jesper Buus Nielsen


We present a new protocol for maliciously secure two-party computation based on cut-and-choose of garbled circuits using the recent idea of “forge-and-loose”, which eliminates around a factor 3 of garbled circuits that needs to be constructed and evaluated. Our protocol introduces a new way to realize the “forge-and-loose” approach, which avoids an auxiliary secure two-party computation protocol, does not rely on any number theoretic assumptions and parallelizes well in a same instruction, multiple data (SIMD) framework. With this approach we prove our protocol universally composable secure against a malicious adversary assuming access to oblivious transfer, commitment and coin-tossing functionalities in the random oracle model. Finally, we construct, and benchmark, a SIMD implementation of this protocol using a GPU as a massive SIMD device. The findings compare favorably with all previous implementations of maliciously secure, two-party computation.

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Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. SCN 2014
cryptographic protocolsimplementationsecure two-party computationgarbled circuits
Contact author(s)
jot2re @ cs au dk
2015-05-11: last of 3 revisions
2014-04-21: received
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      author = {Tore Kasper Frederiksen and Thomas Pelle Jakobsen and Jesper Buus Nielsen},
      title = {Faster Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation Using the {GPU}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/270},
      year = {2014},
      doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_21},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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