Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/240

Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries

Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud

Abstract: We describe an automatic analysis to check secure multiparty computation protocols against privacy leaks. The analysis is sound --- a protocol that is deemed private does not leak anything about its private inputs, even if active attacks are performed against it. Privacy against active adversaries is an essential ingredient in constructions aiming to provide security (privacy + correctness) in adversarial models of intermediate (between passive and active) strength. Using our analysis we are able to show that the protocols used by the Sharemind secure multiparty computation platform are actively private.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation, input privacy, active adversary

Date: received 4 Apr 2014

Contact author: martinp at ut ee

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140415:065340 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2014/240