Paper 2014/240
Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries
Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud
Abstract
We describe an automatic analysis to check secure multiparty computation protocols against privacy leaks. The analysis is sound --- a protocol that is deemed private does not leak anything about its private inputs, even if active attacks are performed against it. Privacy against active adversaries is an essential ingredient in constructions aiming to provide security (privacy + correctness) in adversarial models of intermediate (between passive and active) strength. Using our analysis we are able to show that the protocols used by the Sharemind secure multiparty computation platform are actively private.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- secure computationinput privacyactive adversary
- Contact author(s)
- martinp @ ut ee
- History
- 2014-04-15: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/240
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/240,
author = {Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud},
title = {Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/240},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/240}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/240}
}
