Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/240
Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries
Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud
Abstract: We describe an automatic analysis to check secure multiparty computation protocols against privacy leaks. The analysis is sound --- a protocol that is deemed private does not leak anything about its private inputs, even if active attacks are performed against it. Privacy against active adversaries is an essential ingredient in constructions aiming to provide security (privacy + correctness) in adversarial models of intermediate (between passive and active) strength. Using our analysis we are able to show that the protocols used by the Sharemind secure multiparty computation platform are actively private.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation, input privacy, active adversary
Date: received 4 Apr 2014
Contact author: martinp at ut ee
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Version: 20140415:065340 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2014/240
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]