Paper 2014/240

Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries

Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud

Abstract

We describe an automatic analysis to check secure multiparty computation protocols against privacy leaks. The analysis is sound --- a protocol that is deemed private does not leak anything about its private inputs, even if active attacks are performed against it. Privacy against active adversaries is an essential ingredient in constructions aiming to provide security (privacy + correctness) in adversarial models of intermediate (between passive and active) strength. Using our analysis we are able to show that the protocols used by the Sharemind secure multiparty computation platform are actively private.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
secure computationinput privacyactive adversary
Contact author(s)
martinp @ ut ee
History
2014-04-15: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/240
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/240,
      author = {Martin Pettai and Peeter Laud},
      title = {Automatic Proofs of Privacy of Secure Multi-Party Computation Protocols Against Active Adversaries},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/240},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/240}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/240}
}
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