Paper 2014/226

Weak-Key Analysis of POET

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem, Andrey Bogdanov, and Elmar Tischhauser

Abstract

We evaluate the security of the recently proposed authenticated encryption scheme POET with regard to weak keys when its universal hash functions are instantiated with finite field multiplications. We give explicit constructions for weak key classes not covered by POET's weak key testing strategy, and demonstrate how to leverage them to obtain universal forgeries.

Note: Editorial updates.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
CAESARPOETAuthenticated EncryptionPolynomial hashingForgery polynomialsWeak keys
Contact author(s)
mohab @ dtu dk
History
2014-04-09: revised
2014-03-29: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/226
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/226,
      author = {Mohamed Ahmed Abdelraheem and Andrey Bogdanov and Elmar Tischhauser},
      title = {Weak-Key Analysis of POET},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/226},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/226}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/226}
}
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