Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/218

A Practical Universal Forgery Attack against PAES-8

Yu Sasaki and Lei Wang

Abstract: \paes~is an authenticated encryption scheme designed by Ye {\it et al.}, and submitted to the CAESAR competition. The designers claim that \paese, which is one of the designs of the \paes-family, provides 128-bit security in the nonce misuse model. In this note, we show our forgery attack against \paese.

Our attack works in the nonce misuse model. The attack exploits the slow propagation of message differences. The attack is very close to the universal forgery attack. As long as the target message is not too short, {\it e.g.} more than 10 blocks (160 bytes), a tag is forged only with $2^{11}$ encryption oracle calls, $2^{11}$ computational cost, and negligible memory.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / PAES, Universal Forgery Attack, Nonce Misuse

Date: received 24 Mar 2014

Contact author: sasaki yu at lab ntt co jp

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140324:154455 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]