Paper 2014/143

Statistical Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge

Claudio Orlandi, Rafail Ostrovsky, Vanishree Rao, Amit Sahai, and Ivan Visconti

Abstract

The notion of Zero Knowledge introduced by Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff in STOC 1985 is fundamental in Cryptography. Motivated by conceptual and practical reasons, this notion has been explored under stronger definitions. We will consider the following two main strengthened notions. -- Statistical Zero Knowledge: here the zero-knowledge property will last forever, even in case in future the adversary will have unlimited power. -- Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge: here the zero-knowledge property is combined with non-transferability and the adversary fails in mounting a concurrent man-in-the-middle attack aiming at transferring zero-knowledge proofs/arguments. Besides the well-known importance of both notions, it is still unknown whether one can design a zero-knowledge protocol that satisfies both notions simultaneously. In this work we shed light on this question in a very strong sense. We show a {\em statistical concurrent non-malleable} zero-knowledge argument system for $\NP$ with a {\em black-box} simulator-extractor.

Note: This revision was made to clear a typo in the author list and in the list of acknowledgements.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in Tcc 2014
Contact author(s)
vhvanshvansh @ gmail com
History
2014-03-03: revised
2014-02-27: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/143
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/143,
      author = {Claudio Orlandi and Rafail Ostrovsky and Vanishree Rao and Amit Sahai and Ivan Visconti},
      title = {Statistical Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/143},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/143}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/143}
}
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