Paper 2014/123

FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes

Mohammad Sadeq Dousti and Rasool Jalili

Abstract

This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.Advances in Mathematics of Communications (AMC)
DOI
10.3934/amc.2015.9.471
Keywords
Authenticated Key Exchange ProtocolForward SecurityKey Evolving SchemesProvable SecuritySecurity Model
Contact author(s)
msdousti @ gmail com
History
2015-11-23: last of 4 revisions
2014-02-24: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/123
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/123,
      author = {Mohammad Sadeq Dousti and Rasool Jalili},
      title = {FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/123},
      year = {2014},
      doi = {10.3934/amc.2015.9.471},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/123}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/123}
}
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