Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/120

Automated Proof for Authorization Protocols of TPM 2.0 in Computational Model (full version)

Weijin Wang, Yu Qin, Dengguo Feng, Xiaobo Chu

Abstract: We present the first automated proof of the authorization protocols in TPM 2.0 in the computational model. The Trusted Platform Module(TPM) is a chip that enables trust in computing platforms and achieves more security than software alone. The TPM interacts with a caller via a predefined set of commands. Many commands reference TPM-resident structures, and use of them may require authorization. The TPM will provide an acknowledgement once receiving an authorization. This interact ensure the authentication of TPM and the caller. In this paper, we present a computationally sound mechanized proof for authorization protocols in the TPM 2.0. We model the authorization protocols using a probabilistic polynomial-time calculus and prove authentication between the TPM and the caller with the aid of the tool CryptoVerif, which works in the computational model. In addition, the prover gives the upper bounds to break the authentication between them.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / TPM, Trusted Computing, formal methods, computational model, authorization

Original Publication (with minor differences): ISPEC2014

Date: received 16 Feb 2014, last revised 3 Mar 2014

Contact author: wangweijin at tca iscas ac cn

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140303:093017 (All versions of this report)

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