Paper 2014/060

Verifiable Computation in Multiparty Protocols with Honest Majority

Peeter Laud and Alisa Pankova

Abstract

We present a generic method for turning passively secure protocols into protocols secure against covert attacks. The method adds a post-execution verification phase to the protocol that allows a misbehaving party to escape detection only with negligible probability. The execution phase, after which the computed protocol result is already available for parties, has only negligible overhead added by our method. The checks, based on linear probabilistically checkable proofs, are done in zero-knowledge, thereby preserving the privacy guarantees of the original protocol. Our method is inspired by recent results in verifiable computation, adapting them to multiparty setting and significantly lowering their computational costs for the provers.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ProvSec 2014
Keywords
Secure multiparty computationverifiable computationlinear PCP
Contact author(s)
peeter @ cyber ee
History
2014-08-07: last of 2 revisions
2014-01-28: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/060
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/060,
      author = {Peeter Laud and Alisa Pankova},
      title = {Verifiable Computation in Multiparty Protocols with Honest Majority},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/060},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/060}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/060}
}
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