### Cryptanalysis of FIDES

Itai Dinur and Jérémy Jean

##### Abstract

FIDES is a lightweight authenticated cipher, presented at CHES 2013. The cipher has two version, providing either 80-bit or 96-bit security. In this paper, we describe internal state-recovery attacks on both versions of FIDES, and show that once we recover the internal state, we can use it to immediately forge any message. Our attacks are based on a guess-and-determine algorithm, exploiting the slow diffusion of the internal linear transformation of FIDES. Our most basic attacks have time complexities of 2^{75} and 2^{90} for FIDES-80 and FIDES-96, respectively, use a very small amount of memory, and their most distinctive feature is their very low data complexity: the attacks require at most 24 bytes of an arbitrary plaintext and its corresponding ciphertext, in order to break the cipher with probability 1. In addition to the basic attacks, we describe optimized attacks which exploit additional data in order to reduce the time complexities to 2^{73} and 2^{88} for FIDES-80 and FIDES-96, respectively.

Note: Extended version of the FSE 2014 proceedings paper.

Available format(s)
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in FSE 2014
Keywords
Authenticated EncryptionFIDESCryptanalysisGuess-And-Determine
Contact author(s)
Jeremy Jean @ ens fr
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/058

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/058,
author = {Itai Dinur and Jérémy Jean},
title = {Cryptanalysis of FIDES},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/058},
year = {2014},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/058}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/058}
}

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